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RECENT CASES
has probably undermined the policy reasons for remaining with Schwartz in the
future.
Whether the decision will be applied to other malpractice is not clear.
Certainly the equities are no less demanding when the plaintiff is injured by
an injection, 3 by a surveyor's careless measurements,3 4 or by an attorney's
failure to act before a statute of limitations barred his client's claim. 5 Sig-
nificantly, these various types of malpractice have been covered by the New
York statute of limitations for malpractice.3 6 A lower court decision after
Flanagan suggests that the discovery principle may not be applied to other
professional malpractice. In May, 1969, a trial court in Marine Midland
Trust Co. v. Penberthy37 applied the "continuous treatment theory" 8 to a
legal malpractice situation. Thus, the traditional rule for the running of the
statute still exists in one type of relationship but not another even though the
same equitable issues arise. Until a similar malpractice case comes before the
Court of Appeals again, New York will have to be content with a very limited
discovery rule. In light of the twenty years of Law Revision Commission rec-
ommendations and decisions in other jurisdictions, the Court of Appeals should
certainly uphold the majority rationale and, upon reconsideration of the issues,
expand the scope of the rule to include all undiscovered malpractice.
JERomE D. Scm
NEGLIGENCE-PERSONAL INJURY-GENx L RELEASE SUBJECT TO
REscissioN WHERE PARTIEs ARE MISTAxEN ABOUT TEE EXTENT AND EXIST-
ENCE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES
Infant plaintiff, injured in an automobile accident, was examined by three
doctors and then assured that the only injury that resulted was to her lower
spine. Since the date of injury she had complained of pain radiating down the
back of her posterior left thigh and a "clicking" sound in the region of her left
hip. Her counsel settled her claim for $1,000 and prepared general releases
relinquishing "all claims for personal injuries, medical expenses, loss of wages
(claims for expenses and loss of service) as a result of an automobile accident
on February 26, 1963." Six months later she was again examined by a doctor
who stated that the accident had caused an additional injury, an avascular
33. Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chemical Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2a 142,
237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963).
34. Seger v. Cornwell, 44 Misc.2d 994, 255 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. 1964). The court
viewed Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chemical Corp. as controlling.
35. Siegel v. Kranis, 52 Misc.2d 78, 274 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Sup. Ct. 1966). The court
applied the traditional rule and held that "New York takes the view that fraudulent con-
cealment does not toll the statute of limitations." Id. at 80, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 970.
36. See supra note 1 for statutory history.
37. 301 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
38. See supra note 14.
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necrosis of the femoral head of the left hip. The doctor believed that such a
condition could be brought about by a blow to the knee area which by forcing
the femoral head into its socket damaged the blood supply. His diagnosis ex-
plained the click as the result of the gradual flattening of the femoral head, a
phenomenon which would not develop until about six months after the initial
impact. Therefore, he concluded that the plaintiff must have been mistaken
when she said that she noticed the "click" so soon after the injury. The plaintiff
and her father brought an action for personal injuries and sought to have the
releases set aside on the grounds of mutual mistake. They asserted that the
parties neither intended the releases to cover the unknown injury nor to cover
the known injury. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and sought
summary judgment on the ground that the releases were executed to cover all
claims resulting from the accident. They further contended that the record
demonstrated that infant plaintiff, her father, her attorney and her two doctors
were all cognizant of the existence of an injury to her left hip at the time of the
court approval of the compromise. The trial court denied the motions and the
defendants appealed. The Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed
the trial court's ruling on the motion for summary judgment and held for
the defendants.1 The Court of Appeals reversed and held, the motion for
summary judgment failed to demonstrate as a matter of law both that the
plaintiff's injury was known at the time of settlement and that the parties
intended to release both the known and unknown injuries. Mangini v. McClurg,
24 N.Y.2d 556 (1969).
Releases have been defined as contracts "whereby the injured party accepts
monetary consideration and agrees in return to forego all claims arising out of
his injury."'2 Therefore, if one views the problem by this simple notion one is
led to the conclusion that the courts are bound to make determinations about
personal injury releases solely in accordance with the law of contracts." How-
ever, equitable principles have modified the traditional view that once a party
freely enters into a contract there is no recourse but to give the agreement full
effect. These considerations are especially relevant in the personal injury field.
The tendency on the part of the courts toward flexibility in order to reach a
just result under the circumstances of each controversy is not surprising, for it
is common in this area to find unbalanced bargaining among the parties. 4 In
the typical setting the individual releasor bargains away his cause of action
with a releasee, usually an insurance carrier, who commands more legal expertise
and superior economic strength. The insurance carrier has the ability to con-
tinue negotiations for long periods of time; a plaintiff from the outset, by
1. Mangini v. McClurg, 27 A.D.2d 194, 277 N.Y.S.2d 991 (3d Dep't 1967).
2. Note, Avoidance of Tort Release, 13 W. RIs. L. Rxv. 768 (1962).
3. Garcia v. California Truck Co., 183 Cal. App. 767, 192 P. 708 (1920); Moses v.
Carver, 164 Misc. 204, 298 N.Y.S. 378 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Picklesimer v. Baltimore & Ohio
Ry., 151 Ohio St. 1, 84 N.E.2d 214 (1949).
4. Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537 (1957); Dutch v. Giaquinto, 15
A.D.2d 20, 222 N.Y.S.2d 101 (3d Dep't 1961).
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economic necessity, is under pressure to bargain. Moreover, he is usually repre-
sented by an attorney who is also under considerable pressure to end the dispute
quickly and preferably without the burden of a trial. Therefore, releases are
an accepted method to attain "general peace" by ending the controversy, and
to reduce the huge number of personal injury claims that are clogging -court
dockets.5 They are based on the assumption, embodied in our legal system,'
that most individuals are capable of managing their own affairs and generally
should be able to freely enter into binding legal agreements. Once the parties
have done this they should not escape their contractual duties through the use
of hindsight.0 It is for this reason that the burden of setting aside a general
release is cast upon the plaintiff.7 Consequently, for the same reason releases
have generally been set aside only on limited grounds of fraud, misrepresenta-
tion and mistake.8 Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the need to preserve the
stability of contracts must be weighed against equitable considerations which
are especially relevant in the personal injury field. This countervailing policy
to entertain equitable considerations in particular cases is further strengthened
by the general experience that the average amounts of settlements are far be-
low the average of jury verdicts.9 Hence, the majority of courts, including those
of New York, look beyond the actual wording of personal injury releases and
seek the intent of the parties which may absolve them from the literal terms
of the release.-0 In searching for this intent the courts look to collateral mat-
ters such as the nature of the injury, the intelligence and bargaining positions
of the parties, the amount of consideration, the presence of counsel, the ability
to detect injury, and the haste in settlement. 1
In the instant case the plaintiffs primarily urged mutual mistake in their
effort to set aside the general release. This method of attacking releases ques-
tions an essential element of the contract, namely assent, that is, the common
understanding concerning the subject of the bargain. 12 The body of, law that
5. Knapp Engraving Co. v. John Post Constr. Corp., 107 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Sup. Ct. 1951),
aff'd 280 A.D. 763, 113 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1st Dep't 1952), appeal denied, 280 AD. 864, 114
N.Y.S.2d 256 (1st Dep't 1952).
6. Oakley v. Duerbeck Co., 366 S.W.2d 430, 433 (Mo. 1963). The court stated: "What
is today only a conjecture, an opinion, or a guess, might by tomorrow, through the exercise
of hindsight, be regarded then as an absolute fact."
7. Brusseau v. Potter's Estate, 217 Mich. 165, 185 N.W. 836 (1921); Moses v. Carver,
164 Misc. 204, 298 N.Y.S. 378 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Davison v. Tamas, 30 Misc. 156, 63 N.Y.S.
828 (Sup. Ct. 1899).
8. Amend v. Hurley, 293 N.Y. 587, 59 N.E.2d 416 (1944); Porter v. Commercial
Casualty Ins. Co., 292 N.Y. 176, 54 N.E.2d (1944).
9. Havighurst, Problems Concerning Settlement Agreements, 53 Nw. .LL. REv. 283
(1958). At 299-300, note 56, Havighurst lists numerous cases showing large discrepancies
between settlement and jury verdict awards.
10. Clancy v. Pacenti, 16 II. App. 2d 171, 145 N.E.2d 802 (1957).
11. Schoenfield v. Baker, 267 Minn. 122, 114 N.W.2d 560 (1962); Aron v. Gillman,
309 N.Y. 157, 128 N.E.2d 284 (1955); Atterbury v. Bank of Washington Heights of City
of New York, 241 N.Y. 231, 149 N.E. 841 (1925). RESTAThZM T oF CoNTRACrs § 230(1932).
12. Moser v. York Cloak & Suit Co., 112 Misc. 480, 183 N.Y.S. 27 (Sup. "Ct. App.
Terra 1920); Singer v. 'Karron, 162 Misc. 809, 294 N.Y.S. 566 (N.Y.C. Man. Ct. 1937).
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has been developed to solve this issue is complex, divergent and confusing. It
is difficult to rationalize the explanations given in different jurisdictions tor
allowing or disallowing rescission of general releases on the ground of mutual
mistake. Early decisions held that a mistake as to the existence or extent of
personal injuries was merely a mistake of opinion and not of fact and therefore
a general release was considered a complete defense to future action.'6 A dwin-
dling minority of courts still adhere to this early view that the mistake does
not relate to a present or past fact essential to the contract but merely ex-
presses, in the light of present facts, an opinion respecting future conditions.
Therefore, under this analysis the parties are not mistaken about what they
bargained, but only about the future effect that the contract will have. These
courts distinguish between fact and prophecy. They hold that the lack of
knowledge concerning the extent of a known injury or the existence of an un-
known injury is merely a mistake in prophecy, not a factual mistake about the
meaning of the contract. However, under this view it developed that if there
is a mutual mistake in diagnosis, as opposed to prognosis, a ground for setting
aside a release exists.14 This development toward more liberal rescission con-
tinues and is manifested in the growing number of jurisdictions which allow
rescission where there is mistake about the presence of an unknown injury or
about the extent of a known injury.' 5 These courts reason that the parties, not
comprehending the serious condition of the injured party, could not have in-
cluded it within the reach of their contract.' 6 The distinctions between opinion
and fact, and diagnosis and prognosis are abandoned. If the parties bargain
without full knowledge of the injured party's condition, they are mistaken as
to an essential element of the contract, namely adequate compensation for in-
juries suffered. New York is in line with the majority of jurisdictions which
allows liberal rescission where an injury present but undiscovered at the time
of settlement is later uncovered.17 Thus, the development in New York has
stopped short of unlimited rescission. The New York courts reason that an un-
known injury is an essential prerequisite to setting aside a general release on
the grounds of mutual mistake; since the injury is unknown it could not have
been contemplated by the parties as part of the bargain encompassed in the
release.18 This approach developed from an early case which held that a releasor
13. Tewksbury v. Fellsway Laundry, 319 Mass. 386, 65 N.E.2d 918 (1946); Nelson v.
Chicago & N.W.R. Co., 111 Minn. 193, 126 N.W. 902 (1910); Kane v. Chester Traction Co.,
186 Pa. 145, 40 A. 320 (1898).
14. Great Northern Ry. v. Fowler, 136 F. 118 (9th Cir. 1905); Poti v. New England
Road Machinery Co., 83 N.H. 232, 140 A. 587 (1928).
15. Union Pacific Ry. v. Zinner, 87 Cal. App. 2d 524, 197 P.2d 363 (1948); Sullivan
v. Elgin, J. & E.R. Co., 331 Ill. App. 613, 73 N.E.2d 632 (1947); Hanson v. Northern
States Power Co., 198 Minn. 24, 268 N.W. 642 (1936).
16. Graham v. Atchison, T. & S. Ry. Co., 176 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1949); Fraser v.
Glass, 311 ]E. App. 336, 35 N.E.2d 953 (1941).
17. Scheer v. Long Island Ry. Co., 282 A.D. 724, 122 N.YS.2d 217 (2d Dep't 1953);
Dominicis v. United States Casualty Co., 132 AD. 553, 116 N.Y.S. 975 (3d Dep't 1909).
18. Landau v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc., 237 A.D. 141, 260 N.Y.S. 561 (1st Dep't
1932).
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may set aside a release if a specific cause of action in his favor, which existed
at the time of execution of the release, was included in it, contrary to the in-
tention of the parties.19 In granting rescission under this view the New York
courts draw a waivering line between mistake as to the existence of an unknown
injury and mistake as to the extent of a known injury. In the first instance the
courts will grant relief whereas in the second they will not. The rationale for
this view is that a releasor is in essence taking the risk that the nature and
extent of known injuries will be more serious than was expected when he enters
into the release. This risk is thought to be within the sphere of contemplation in
a bargain whereas this is not necessarily true of an unknown injury.20 New
York and jurisdictions following this approach do not deny that a defendant
may utilize a release as a method of attaining "general peace." However, in
drawing this basic distinction these courts permit the plaintiff to show by
extrinsic evidence that the release was intended to cover solely the known in-
jury. Therefore, if the courts strictly adhere to viewing a case through the
"known-unknown" dichotomy, equitable decisions are made to depend on the
characterization of the plaintiff's injury.
The New York Court of Appeals in the instant case was faced with the
dilemma of rendering a just decision in a case which defied easy characteriza-
tion of the plaintiff's injuries. Could the injury be fitted into the "unknown
injury" category? More specifically, was knowledge of symptoms erroneously
attributed to the known injury the equivalent of the distinct injury so as to
preclude a mutual mistake of fact? The court concluded that there must be
actual knowledge of the injury to include it within a release; mere knowledge
of an injury to a single area of the body does not put a party on notice of
another injury of a different type and gravity in the same area.2 ' Hence, on this
first issue there is present a question of fact since a jury could find that at the time
of settlement the parties believed that the plaintiff's hip and left femur were
uninjured 2 2 This view further refines the "unknown injury" classification
by requiring that plaintiff must actually know that the symptoms she experi-
enced were from the distinct injury to make it a "known injury." The second
issue confronting the court was whether the release was given in consideration
for ending the defendant's liability or merely as compensation for the known
injuries at the time of settlement. The court cited Farrington v. Harlem Sav-
ings Bank, which states the New York equitable rule that a release "fairly"
and "knowingly" made to cover both known and unknown injuries will be given
19. Kirchner v. New Home Sewing Machine Co., 135 N.Y. 182, 31 N.E. 1104 (1892).
20. Miles v. New York Central Ry. Co., 195 A.D. 748, 178 N.Y.S. 637 (Sup. Ct. Sp.
Term. 1919); Doyle v. Teasdale, 263 Wis. 328, 57 N.W.2d 381 (1953).
21. Lockrow v. Church of the Holy Family, 5 AlD. 959, 171 N.Y.S.2d 622, (4th Dep't
1958) aff'd 5 N.Y.2d 1024, 185 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1959).
22. Barry v. Lewis, 259 A.D. 496, 20 N.Y.S.2d 88 (4th Dep't 1940); Brown v.
Manshul Realty Corp., 271 AD. 222, 63 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't 1946); Rill v. Darling,
21 A.D.2d 955, 251 N.Y.S.2d 396 (3d Dep't 1964).
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full effect as an agreement for "general peace. '28 Applying the test of "fairness"
and "knowledge" to the present case the court denied summary judgment. In
essence the court's holding insures that the plaintiff, in this type of case, will
have access to the jury on the issue of the parties' intent.
The court's approach to the problem of inequitable release agreements in
the. personal injury field seems deficient. If a plaintiff is mistaken as to the ex-
tent of injuries a release is a bar.24 However, the plaintiff may be just as mis-
taken about what he bargained for as in the "unknown injury" situation. More
importantly, the result may be just as inequitable where there is only a mis-
take about the extent of injury. In the present case the court was directly
confronted with the possibility of an unjust decision based merely upon classi-
fication of the plaintiff's injuries. Therefore, it is suggested that the court's
"known-unknown" dichotomy is not conducive to just decisions in the personal
injury field. The court must have been aware of the possibility that a contrary
decision would have left the minor plaintiff without adequate compensation for
her injuries. Fortunately, an equitable decision was reached but at the price of
an intensive struggle by the court to refine an inappropriate classification
scheme of types of injuries. There is no imperative need to adhere to it. Per-
sonal injury settlements are based upon an assumption of the existence of a
state of facts, namely the condition of the plaintiff. If the parties' views of
these essential facts are incorrect, then they are mistaken as to what they have
bargained about. Under this simplified contract approach general releases
should be rescinded whenever an injured party experiences further complications
which are discovered after settlement that if not compensated for, would result
in a grossly inequitable situation. This would enable the courts to deal directly
and openly with this problem and to abandon a classification scheme which
may lead to inequitable decisions.
VICTOR OLIVERI
SELECTIVE SERVICE LAW-IN PROVnING FOR CONSCIENTIOUS On-
jECTOR EXEmPTION, FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION CLAUSE OF FIRST AMEND-
MENT PRECLUDES DISCmMNATON IN FAVOR OF THOSE WITH FORMAL
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
On April 17, 1968, John Sisson, Jr., in obedience to an order from his local
Board, reported to the Boston, Massachusetts induction center for induction
into the armed forces. After being warned of the consequences by the officer-in-
charge, Sisson deliberately refused to be inducted. Since his objections were
based upon convictions of general morality and conscience, Sisson did not claim
in any formal sense to be a religious conscientious objector. Additionally, Sisson
23. 280 N.Y. 1 (.1939).
24. Moyer v. Scholz, 22 A.D. 50, 25-3 N.Y.S.2d 483 (3d Dep't 1964).
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